Recently, economic model has been widely applied in cloud platforms for regulating virtual resource sharing. In the economic model, resource pricing scheme plays a key role for managing the relationship between cloud users and cloud providers. In this paper, we present a novel pricing scheme for virtual resource provision with aiming at improving resource utilisation and reducing operational costs for cloud providers. Unlike previous studies, the proposed pricing scheme applies producer-retailer-client model to describe the procedure of virtual resource trade and provides the optimal pricing solution by using gaming theory. Extensive experiments are conducted in a real-world cloud platform, and the results demonstrate that the proposed pricing scheme outperforms other approaches in terms of the increased profit and the reduction of variance of virtual resource prices.
Introduction
In recent years, cloud computing has emerged as a promising paradigm that substantiates the vision of computing, storage, and networking resources (Beloglazov and Buyya, 2013; Zhang and Zhang, 2015) . In cloud platforms, users' applications are deployed over the shared virtual resources which offer their capabilities as various services. More specifically, all applications run in complete isolation through virtual execution environments or virtual machine (VM) instances which are seamlessly launched and terminated to host applications of cloud users (Spillner et al., 2013; Sakr, 2014) . As a result, cloud users have covers plenty of areas ranging from small-scale companies to worldwide enterprises (Beloglazov and Buyya, 2013; Ro, 2015) .
Regardless the convenience of cloud platforms, unpredictable workload becomes the major problem when operating a cloud-based data centre (Chaisiri et al., 2012; Corradi and Rana, 2014) . For example, a spike in the requested VMs may result in higher service rejection rates and experienced delays by users due to congested resources (Xu and Musgrave, 2014) . The most mentioned solution to deal with this problem is to over-provision the virtual resources at all times so as to meet user's maximal demands (Mian et al., 2013; Xu and Musgrave, 2014) . Obviously, this solution will lead to low resource utilisation especially during the periods of low user demands. A more efficient solution is to only guarantee the availability of VMs to a limited number of users and plan the cloud capacity to meet their peak workloads (Javadi et al., 2013) . In this way, cloud providers will offer the spare capacity during low utilisation periods to other users who can take advantage of reduced prices but with no service availability guarantees. Unfortunately, demand fluctuations of guaranteed-service users reflect similar variations in VM availability, which in turn leads to unpredictable request delays, rejections and termination as well as price fluctuations (Feng and Li, 2014; Yang et al., 2014) .
Economic models have been demonstrated to be attractive for distributed resource providers in many recent studies (Veit and Gentzsch, 2008; Chunlin and Layuan, 2011; Haque and Alhashmi, 2014) . In this work, we present a novel pricing scheme for virtual resource provision with aiming at improving resource utilisation and reducing operational costs for cloud providers. In this pricing scheme, several pricing functions are designed based on virtual resource utilisations to leverage the user's demands. Meanwhile, a pricing algorithm is designed to figure out the optimum pricing solution under the constraint to cloud provider's profit and operational cost. By the proposed approach, the prices of virtual resources can be dynamically managed by cloud providers to achieve better trade-offs between performance and user's quality of service (QoS) satisfactions.
The rest of this paper is organised as following. In Section 2, we summarise the related work. In Section 3, we present the framework of the proposed pricing scheme. In Section 4, the pricing algorithm is implemented and analysed in details. In Section 5, extensive experiments are conducted to evaluate the performance of the proposed pricing scheme. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper with a brief discussion of our future work.
Related work
In distributed computing area, resource markets have been proposed for several years aiming at sharing computational resources in the presence of rational users (Veit and Gentzsch, 2008; Chunlin and Layuan, 2011; Beloglazov and Buyya, 2013) . Generally speaking, a resource market might consist of the environment, rules and mechanisms where distributed resources are exchanged by either bartering or pricing approaches. With respect to bartering mechanism, distributed resources are exchanged directly without using any form of currency. For instance, the BONIC platform allows users to donate their CPU cycles by running a software client which polls a server for new jobs (Anderson, 2004) ; While, the BitTorrent platform allows rational users to behave selfishly but punishing them by other users (Han and Kim, 2012) . The bartering mechanism is simple to implement and allows several types of incentives for rational users. The shortcoming of bartering mechanism is that it only allows exchanges between a single resource types. To achieve exchanging multiple resource types, pricing mechanism is required in most scenarios. Pricing is the process of computing the exchange value of resources relative to a common form of currency, and its form might be fixed or dynamic (Anshelevich et al., 2012; Xu and Li, 2013; Ye et al., 2014) . For example, Amazon provides disk space for $0.15/GB and several types of VM instance with different prices. When using dynamic pricing, the resource price is computed for each request according to the pricing mechanism used and some financial incentives might be used to motivate rational users to adjust their resource demands in terms of time or space.
To efficiently allocating plenty of resources, many well-known grid platforms use bargaining or negotiation to determine the resource price, such as Nimrod/G (Buyya et al., 2000) and G-QoSM (Al-Ali et al., 2004) . The advantage of such an approach is that sellers and buyers communicate directly without the participant of a third party. The seller attempts to maximise their resource profits while the buyer strives to minimise their resource costs. Unfortunately, high communication cost remains the major disadvantage of bargaining and negotiation mechanisms. For example, in a large-scale resource market, each buyer has to negotiate with all sellers of a resource type in order to maximise its utility. The communication costs grow further when a buyer requires more than one resource types. Thus, scalability becomes a major issue when increasing the number of users or the number of resource types in a request.
In recent cloud platforms, plenty of resource pricing mechanisms have been proposed which provide well support for online banking and currency transfer technologies. For example, in Javadi et al. (2013) , the authors conducted a comprehensive analysis of spot VM instances based on one year price history in four data centres of Amazon's EC2. In Deng et al. (2014) , the authors carried out researches on the energy optimal method achieved by a priced timed automaton for cloud platforms, and proposed an algorithm to settle the minimum path energy consumption problem. In Feng and Li (2014) , the authors presented an in-depth game theoretic study of competition market with multiple competing IaaS cloud providers. They characterised the nature of non-cooperative competition in an IaaS cloud market with a goal of capturing how each IaaS cloud provider will select its optimal prices to compete with the others. In addition, they also figured out the sufficient conditions for the existence of a Nash equilibrium when making distributed a pricing decision in federated cloud environments. In Samaan (2014) , the author presented an economic model to regulate capacity sharing in a federation of hybrid cloud providers, which establishes the uncertainty in future revenue can act as a participation incentive to sharing in the repeated game. In Son and Sim (2015) , the authors designed a multi-issue negotiation mechanism to facilitate concurrent price, time slot, and QoS negotiations including the design of QoS utility functions.
Considering that the cloud provider can offer n VM instances for users, the price of these VMs is p i . Like many studies, we use queue models to describe the working of these VM instances. Therefore, each VM can be characterised as <λ i , μ i >, where λ i denotes average arrival rate of user's request and μ i is defined as its average service rate. By this way, the overall revenue obtained by cloud provider can be noted as
where l i denotes the fraction of workload allocated to VM I, O(p i , l i ) is the operational cost function for cloud provider, which is decided by resource price and resource utilisation. From the perspective of cloud provider, the goal is to maximise δ i for all VMs, which means that an effective pricing scheme plays a critical role to achieve this goal.
As shown in equation (1), l i is decided by the users since they have buy the usage of VMs with constrain to their budgets. That is saying l i is decided by the users instead of cloud providers. On the other side, the price of virtual resource can be totally decided by the cloud providers. Therefore, we design the price function which encourages users to buy them when they are idling and discourages them to allocate them when they are in busy state. Specifically, the pricing scheme is based on the current utilisation of virtual resources. In current platforms, cloud providers can easily obtain a desirable utilisation range [u low , u high ] where virtual resources can provider desirable performance regardless of the intensiveness of workload. So, our idea is to charge a base price if the current utilisation is within this range. On top of it, an additional price is charged to discourage usage if its utilisation is above u high . On the other hand, a certain price is deducted to encourage usage if its utilisation is below u low . For those VMs that are in idle states, we also charge a high price because turning an inactive VM into active mode will increase the operational costs (i.e., power consumption).
In our price scheme, base i p is defined as the base price when the utilisation of VM i is in the range of [u low , u high ]. Meanwhile, the encourage price and discourage price can be easily defined as:
where k i is the factor of discourage and encourage prices. Also, it can be considered as the discourage and encourage functions. Typically, the base price could be dynamically determined by existing pricing algorithms but for certain utilisation the encouraging or discouraging prices should have the same impact on the final price. As to the k i function, using exponential functions may cause the encouraging price to increase too fast even at utilisations just below the desired range. For convenience of implementation, we define k i as the diffidence between the actual utilisation and different thresholds, which is shown as following: 
where ( ≥ 1) can be considered as experimental constant. In fact, the equation (4) can be defined as other formulations which taking some other QoS metrics into consideration. However, utilisation of virtual resource is the metric that can be easiest obtained and monitored by cloud providers in a real-time manner. More importantly, cloud providers can choose different values to make their resource management policy. For example, higher means that the virtual resource prices are quite sensitive to their workload on them, while lower means they are insensitive to workload. In Section 5, we will conduct different experiments to investigate the effects of different values on the system's performance.
Optimal pricing solution
To obtain the optimal pricing solution, we design a two-phase pricing framework based on the well-known producer-retailer-client model (Osborne and Rubinstein, 1994) , in which there are three types of participants including cloud provider, virtual resource agents (VRA) and cloud users. The framework can be demonstrated in Figure 1 . As shown in Figure 1 , it consists of several computing elements (CE) each representing a set of physical servers, a set of virtual resource agents (VRA) and user jobs. In this model, when a job arrives scheduler is responsible for allocating suitable VRAs based on the job's budgets and deadline, and then dispatches the job to those selected VRAs. The VRAs work as follows: all the VRAs buy resources from cloud providers at a uniform price, and then sell them to users at different retail prices. At a first glance, the VRAs seem like local schedulers in conventional computational clusters. The most distinctive difference between VRA and local scheduler is that VRA can encompass virtual resources across the boundaries of CEs. Furthermore, the VRAs can adjust their size dynamically at runtime. Thus, VRAs can be viewed as virtual clusters. It is the reason that we call them as virtual resource agents.
The reasons that we introduce VRAs to the system are two-fold: firstly, it provides a reasonable resource price scheme to meet job's budget constraint as well as improve resource benefits; secondly, it helps us modelling the working of resources so as to provide quantitative guarantee for job's QoS constraint. In this pricing framework, cloud providers and VRAs cooperate with each other aiming at maximising utilisation and system benefits. The relationship between the VRAs and the users is non-cooperative, as the users always hope to minimise their costs, which would inevitably lower down the benefits of resource providers. To obtain optimal pricing solution, we use gaming theory to analyse the producer-retailer-client model in the following sections.
Solution of cooperative gaming model
VRAs (noted as V i ) and cloud providers both wish to maximise resources utilisation and the system benefits, so we use cooperative model to describe their relationship. In this cooperative model, a solution pair <p * , C> will be derived, where C = (c 1 , c 2 , …, c n ) is a vector representing the resource quantity in each VRA. Let ρ i be the resource utilisation rate of V i . Thus, the utility function of V i can be defined as ,
c p ρ p c where p i is the resource price set by V i for users. Furthermore, we define the total utility function of all VRAs as following
Given the current price set by the system is p * , we can obtain the VRAs' benefits 1 2 ( , , , )
and the total VRAs benefits U V by equation (5). If U V > 0, then it means that the current price p * is too low. As mentioned above, the relationship between the system and VRAs is cooperative, so we consider the benefits obtained by VRAs as the system's benefits. In this way, the system can set a new price 
Solution of non-cooperative gaming model
In the two-phase pricing framework, users tend to select the VRAs with lower retail price and higher resource quantity, because those VRAs are more likely to be able to meet job's budget and deadline constraints. Although a high value of retail price might bring about better benefits for the VRA, its resource utilisation rate will be lowed down too. On the other side, a low retail price can lead to high resource utilisation rate, however, if the benefits of the VRA become negative, its resource quantity will be reduced in the next adjustment of <p * , (c 1 , …, c n )>. So, the solution of the no-cooperative model between VRAs and user jobs are the resource retail prices vector (p 1 , …, p n ).
According to computing economy, if the resource utilisation rate is in high level, a VRA can reduce its retail price, yet still maintain its benefits in a relative high level. So we consider the retail price is a decreasing function of resource utilisation rate, denoted as p i (ρ i ). Then, the utility function of V i can be rewritten as following:
we can get the equation (7). Denote the solution of equation (7) ρ ρ the V i would decrease its price, else the V i would increase its price. This process will be performed repeatedly until an optimal retail price scheme is achieved.
Experiments and performance comparisons

Experimental settings
To investigate the effectiveness of the proposed approach, namely virtual resource pricing scheme (VRPS), we conduct extensive experiments in our campus cloud platform, which consists of 12 high-performance clusters (CN 1~C N 12 ) as computing resources and ten storage servers (SN 1~S N 10 ) as networking file system. The VM instances are generated by using those computing nodes in these clusters companying with extra disk space provided by the storage servers. In all the experiments, the workload (also called user's demands) is generated by using Lublin-Feitelson model (XX), which is derived from the workload logs of real-world supercomputers. It consists of 10,000 VM requests; each is characterised by its arrival time, resource demands, and estimation of execution time. The resource demand of each request is enlarged by f times, where f is uniformly distributed in [10, 20] , so as to simulate the user's requirement in opening cloud environments. As the basic workload does not include deadline, we append each request with a deadline constraint as
where k is a random variable that uniformly distributed in interval [1.5, 5.5].
In the experiments, we select four well-known pricing schemes for performance comparison, including fixed pricing policy (FPP), hotspot pricing policy (HPP), QoS pricing negotiation (QPN) and general market pricing scheme (GMPS). In the following sections, we compare our VRPS with those pricing schemes in terms of resource utilisation, rejection rate, response time, and resource profits.
Comparisons on resource utilisation and rejection rate
As the number of active VM instances has significant influences on the performance of a cloud platform, we configure it with different values ranging from 50 to 200. So, all the experiments are conducted four times with different number of active VM instances. The first performance metric we investigated is the resource utilisation. In this work, we mainly concentrate computing resources, so the resource utilisations only indicate how many computing servers (in CN 1~C N 12 ) are effectively used and the storage servers are ignored. The experimental results are shown in Figure 2 .
As shown in Figure 2 , we can see that increasing active VMs will slightly decreases the resource utilisation rate in most scenarios. This is because that more VM instances (even they are idling) require turning on more computing servers. If the workload is not so much intensive, many computing resources will be in idle state which leads to lower resource utilisation rate. Based on our experimental results, we can see that FPP always leads to lowest utilisation in all cases. In our experimental settings, all the user's requests are included with a limited budget. Under such a constraint, if a request can not find suitable resources within its budget it will be rejected by the system. As noted above, FPP is a fixed pricing scheme which means the resource prices can not be adjusted throughout the experimental period. When the number of active VMs is in a low level (i.e., 50 or 100), we find that GMPS can obtain highest resource utilisation rate. However, it does not happen when our cloud platform has 150 or 200 VM instances. This is because GMPS uses a dynamic pricing scheme which allows all types of VMs adjusting their prices when they are transferred from one state to another. Such a pricing can quickly meet the market demands when the scale of market is small. However, when the resource market becomes big the GMPS has to spend more costs on matching resource demand and supply. While, our VRPS can easily solve this problem since the final resource prices are adjusted only when there exists a VRA whose benefits are not zero. So, the VRPS has more extendibility than other schemes. In Figure 3 , we illustrate the rejection rates when using different pricing schemes. In typical distributed platforms, rejection rate is a QoS metric which is used to evaluate the user's satisfactory on a target system. Since cloud platforms are generally managed by a pay-as-you-go manner. This metric becomes more important when cloud provider's profit is taken into consideration.
As shown in Figure 3 , GMPS and VRPS outperform other schemes in terms of rejection rate. This means that more users' requests can be met even their budget and resource demand are not changed. In short-term, accepting more users might results in performance degradation. However, it is important for a cloud platform to attract more users in the future. As mentioned in Sections 3 and 4, VRPS makes pricing decision based on the runtime resource utilisation. So, it is effective to achieve better trade-offs between system performance and user's popularity.
Comparisons on response time and resource profit
In any distributed systems, job's response time is always a key metric to measure the performance of the target platform. In Figures 4 and 5, we demonstrate the response time in two manners. Firstly, we measure the mean response time of all user requests as shown in Figure 4 ; then we record the real-time response time during the procedure of our experiments as shown in the figure. With respect to the mean response time metric, it can be used to evaluate the overall performance when using different pricing schemes. However, many detailed information will be lost if only using it. So, real-time response time metric can help us to understand the working procedure of a pricing scheme. As shown in Figure 4 , we notice that differences on response time metric between all pricing schemes are very small in most cases, which is especially true for the four compared schemes. In our experiments, there are two factors that have effects on the response time metric. The first one is the user's deadline requirement as shown in equation (8). The experimental cloud platform needs to try its best to meet the user's deadline when allocating and executing VM instances for them. This is baseline for all user's requests in spite of the underlying pricing scheme used. On the other side, VM allocation policy is the other factor that will affect the response time metric. When using different pricing scheme, it always means that different VM allocation policy is used. As shown in Figure 4 , our VRPS can reduce about 10%~15% response time for users. This is because it can balance the workloads between different computing resources. It is noteworthy that our VRPS is designed for improving user's QoS satisfactory and cloud provider's profit instead of job's execution efficiency. Such an experimental result shows that designing effective pricing scheme might be a feasible approach to improving the execution efficiency of cloud platform. Finally, we evaluate the profits obtained by cloud providers when using different pricing schemes as shown in Figure 6 . It is very clear that different pricing scheme will lead to quite different virtual resource profit. The first result is that FPP's resource profit is the lowest in all cases. Such a result again indicated that fixed pricing scheme is not suitable for opening cloud platform as noted in many existing studies. In factor, FPP can be used as a baseline to evaluate other pricing schemes. In our experimental, HPP and GMPS outperform QPN about 5%~7% on this metric, while lower than our VRPS about 3%~11%. An interesting result occurs when the number of active VMs is 200. In this case, the resource profit obtained by using VRPS is significantly higher than all the other schemes. By carefully examining the experimental logs, we find that two-phase pricing scheme plays a key role for increasing the resource profit. More specifically, our VRPS tends to deploy more VM instances on those physical servers whose performance can just-right meet the recent workload intensiveness. In this way, VRPS can avoid to reject some low-budget requests or violate the deadline requirements of those accepted requests. Such an experimental results indicate that the VRPS can be applied in large-scale cloud platforms such a commercial clouds.
Conclusions
In this paper, we take efforts on the virtual resource pricing scheme and present a novel pricing scheme with aiming at improving resource utilisation and reducing operational costs for cloud providers. Unlike previous studies, the proposed pricing scheme applies producer-retailer-client model to describe the procedure of virtual resource trade and provides the optimal pricing solution by using gaming theory. Real-world experiments demonstrate that the proposed pricing scheme outperforms other approaches in terms of several performance metrics. Currently, the proposed VRPS framework is implemented as an isolated model in our cloud platform. In the future, we firstly need to implement is as a plug-in middleware that can be easily incorporated in existing cloud middleware. Then, more performance evaluation will be conducted in various cloud platforms so as to improving the VRPS. In addition, we also plan to take efforts on using other queue models to describe the underlying physical servers so as to study the quantitative relationship between resource demand and supply.
